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"My Country favors a world of free and equal states ... Within the limits of our 
responsibility in such matters, my Country intends to be a participant and not 
merely an observer in this peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the 
status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That continuing tide of self- 
determination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support."
— John F. Kennedy to UN General Assembly, September 25,1961
"We must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples of West Berlin ... We 
have previously admitted our willingness to remove any actual irritants in West 
Berlin, but the freedom of the city is not negotiable. We cannot negotiate with 
those who say, 'What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable.' ... The 
solemn vow each of us gave to West Berlin in time of peace will not be broken in 
time of danger."
— John F. Kennedy's report to the nation on the Berlin crisis, July 25,1961
"Oh, that is entirely different because there are something like two and a quarter 
million West Berliners where there are only seven hundred thousand of those 
Papuans. Moreover, the West Berliners are highly civilized and highly cultured, 
whereas those inhabitants of West New Guinea are living, as it were, in the Stone 
Age."
— John F. Kennedy in conversation with Netherlands Ambassador J. H. van 
Roijen, 1962
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In I960, the Dutch colony of West New Guinea (WNG, later known as West Papua, 
West Irian, Irian Jaya, and Papua) embarked on a ten-year plan slated to end in self- 
determination for its indigenous Papuan population. This plan was presented 
explicitly within the framework of international decolonization and introduced during 
the time when the United Nations was working out its self-determination law, first 
enshrined in the UN declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries 
and peoples (December 14, 1960). WNG was in many ways the first test case, and the 
international community failed this test abysmally. The reason was realpolitik, the 
strategic Cold War imperative driving the United States. The United States, while 
extolling self-determination as a high and holy principle for West Berlin and 
elsewhere, abandoned it for WNG. But it should be noted that the principle was also 
abandoned by the international community and all the players directly involved: 
Indonesia, Australia, and even the Netherlands. The sole exceptions were a group of 
African states whose representatives saw parallels to their own (then very recent) 
experience of political decolonization.
WNG was handed over to Indonesia in 1962 with the promise that an "act of free 
choice" would be put up to a public vote by 1969. That this act was a stage-managed 
whitewash is generally accepted.1 But the principle of self-determination was, in fact, 
abandoned earlier, in the three-way Dutch-Indonesian-American negotiations of 
1960-62. Self-determination was by no means impossible after this point, nor were 
Papuan rights to self-determination extinguished, but the path to self-determination 
was made much harder. After 1962, no major power would take the prospect for self- 
determination seriously in the Papuan case, and thus it was no surprise when the 
international community rubber-stamped the 1969 "act of free choice" and accepted 
WNG's incorporation into Indonesia, an incorporation that is and was shaky under 
international law. This article traces the abandonment of the principle of self- 
determination leading up to the Dutch-Indonesian New York Agreement of August 
1962, which put an end to Dutch rule in Papua and to the self-determination process. It 
does not attempt to address the full course of the dispute and its settlement.2
1 John Saltford, "United Nations Involvement with the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian (Indonesian 
West New Guinea), 1968 to 1969," Indonesia 69 (April 2000): 71-92; Gabriel Defert, L 'Indonesie et la 
Nouvelle-Guinee Occidentale: Maintien des Frontieres Colonwles ou Respect des ldentites Commaunitaires (Paris: 
L'Harmattan, 1996); Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration o f a People, third 
edition (London: TAPOL, 1988); and Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1978).
21 have attempted to address the dispute more fully, from the viewpoint of the United States government, 
in David Webster, "Regimes in Motion: The Kennedy Administration and Indonesia's New Frontier, 1960- 
1962," Diplomatic History 33,1 (January 2009): 92-123. The most detailed source for the 1962 phase of the 
negotiations is Terence C. Markin, "The West Irian Dispute: How the Kennedy Administration Resolved 
that 'Other' Southeast Asian Conflict" (PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). See also 
Christopher McMullen, Mediation o f the West New Guinea Dispute, 1962: A Case Study (Washington, DC: 
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981); William Henderson, West New Guinea: The Dispute and Its 
Settlement (South Orange, NJ: Seton Hall University Press, 1973). A crucial study for this period is Bradley 
R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-lndonesian Relations, 1960-1968 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
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Self-determination Posed: Dutch Policy
WNG had been part of the Dutch East Indies, and the Netherlands retained control 
when it accepted Indonesian independence in 1949. The Dutch government had 
claimed that it intended to remain in WNG to prepare the people for self- 
determination, but this was little more than empty rhetoric until 1960. First advanced 
in order to meet UN requirements (under Article 73[e]) for administration of a non- 
self-governing territory, and scrupulously repeated as mantra in Dutch reports to the 
UN, this claim slowly took on the characteristics of an article of faith in Dutch policy 
and was stubbornly defended as a principle even while it was abandoned in practice. 
At no point were the Dutch willing to name a target date for Papuan independence, 
and they seem to have believed that rhetoric was enough, that the date could be 
extended indefinitely.
The tone of Dutch government attitudes through the 1950s can be summed up in a 
single example. On a visit to Washington, DC, foreign minister Joseph M. A. H. Luns 
explained that the natives of WNG were unswayed by Indonesian infiltrators, that they 
"either apprehended and reported these agitators to the local administration or they 
ate the agitators. He said there was only one variation to this latter practice and that 
existed among the more Christianized natives who would only eat fishermen on 
Fridays."3
The 1960 ten-year self-determination plan was advanced in order to craft a 
compromise among Dutch political parties, force Australia's hand in order to gain its 
military support, and forestall Indonesian moves. It was capped by the election of an 
advisory New Guinea Council in April 1960, with a Papuan majority headed by vice- 
presidents Nicolaas Jouwe and Markus Kaisiepo. However, as Indonesian pressure to 
occupy and govern Papua grew, the Dutch proved less and less willing to consult the 
Council. As the Council pronounced on international affairs and began to act like a de 
facto parliament, Dutch officials stressed repeatedly that the New Guinea Council and 
the new national symbols carried no weight in international law.4
In 1961, Luns advanced a plan that suggested the Netherlands was willing to give 
the UN authority over the future of WNG. This was the result of months of talks with 
American officials, but a Council delegation that visited the Netherlands a month 
before Luns introduced his plan was not informed of this new direction of Dutch 
thinking. On the Luns plan, Council member Eliezer Bonay said that if the Dutch 
pulled out, then WNG would have to declare independence. Dutch officials promised 
that if the Luns proposal failed, they would stand by their promise to ensure that 
Papua would be granted independence in ten years. Another Council member was 
assured that the government was "duty bound to carry out the promises which had 
been made ... the promise once made had to be fulfilled." Minister for WNG Theo Bot 
gave similar assurances during a tour of WNG in early 1962.5
3 Record of meeting, Foreign Relations o f  the United States (henceforth FRUS), 1958-60,17, p. 122.
4 See, for instance, Department of State telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Bermuda, December 21, 
1961, John F. Kennedy Library (henceforth JFKL), National Security Files (henceforth NSF), Box 205.
5 Justus van der Kroef, "Toward 'Papua Barat/" Australian Quarterly 34,1 (March 1962): 20; Peter Savage, 
"Irian Jaya: Reluctant Colony," in Politics in Melanesia (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the
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Perhaps more important than actual Dutch beliefs was the American impression of 
what the Netherlands thought and could be brought to accept. Although the official 
government line from The Hague did not waver until well into 1962, American officials 
were receiving a quite different impression through back channels. Dutch journalist 
Willem Oltmans had been writing articles to muster support of Indonesia's claim to 
WNG for some time, and he briefed John F. Kennedy's national security staff in April 
1961. His proposals were not accepted at the time but began to create the impression 
that, the words of their government notwithstanding, the Dutch people would accept 
American intervention on the side of Indonesia. Oltmans saw the dispute as one over 
"who will train the Papuans to eat with knife and fork."6 American officials always 
noted that the opposition Labour Party in the Netherlands was soft on the WNG issue. 
More importantly, they saw Dutch business as quite willing to hand over WNG, and 
the Dutch as unwilling to fight Indonesian forces in Papua to defend their claims. An 
administration dedicated to the masculinized ideas of dynamism, toughness, and 
"vigor" showed little respect for this stance. If the Dutch were not willing to fight, the 
thinking went, why should others pull their chestnuts from the fire? Consequently, as 
secretary of state Dean Rusk (the most pro-Dutch official in the administration) 
recalled, "I could not see the United States drafting boys off the farms of Kansas and 
the factories of Pittsburgh to do something in West Irian that the burghers of 
Amsterdam were unwilling to do for themselves."7 8
The impression that the Dutch would go along with a handover of WNG despite 
their claims was also confirmed by Dirk Stikker, Secretary-General of NATO and a 
former Dutch foreign minister who American officials believed spoke for the Dutch 
business community. Stikker in April 1961 gave a confidential briefing to former US 
secretary of state Dean Acheson (acting as Kennedy's envoy). Stikker reported that 
"Dutch politicians and people have now progressed to such an extent in their thinking 
that they would be extremely grateful if the US will take leadership in pushing 
through an international trusteeship arrangement for NNG [Netherlands New 
Guinea]." Finally, the views of the Queen's husband, Prince Bernhard, were that the 
Dutch would be willing to accept the handover of WNG, with foreign minister Luns 
the only person adamantly opposed. Bernhard expressed this view on several 
occasions through business back channels, through Acheson, and directly to Kennedy.”
Self-determination Scorned: Indonesian Policy
Indonesian policy was to "regain" WNG, and to deny consistently that Papua had 
a separate right to self-determination. Self-determination, the argument went, had been 
exercised by the entire people of the Dutch East Indies, including WNG, on August 17, 
1945, when Sukarno and Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia. "The people
South Pacific, 1982), p. 9; and Paul W. van der Veur, "Political Awakening in West New Guinea," Pacific 
Affairs 36,1 (1963): 54-73.
6 Oltmans memo and discussion, JFKL, NSF, Box 113; Oltmans memo to Rostow, April 1961, JFKL, 
President's Office Files (henceforth POF), Box 122a.
7 Dean Rusk oral history, JFKL.
8 US embassy The Plague to Department of State (henceforth DOS), April 10,1961, JFKL, POF, Box 122a; 
Henry G. Walter memo to DOS, May 3,1961, JFKL, NSF Box 205.
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whom the Netherlands call Papuans are our brothers and sisters from Irian," as one 
Indonesian ambassador told the UN. "We all belong to the same nation: the Indonesian 
nation."9 Indonesian vice president Mohammad Hatta and a minority of Indonesian 
nationalists had actually been willing to omit Papua from their new independent state, 
although, judging from the records, there seems to be some confusion as to what they 
meant by Papua: some thought WNG, while some apparently meant the Australian- 
ruled Territory of Papua and new Guinea.10 The confusion illustrates how the 
Indonesian nationalist imagination lacked a full awareness of the territory and 
considered it little more than a Dutch prison camp for dissidents.
Some Papuans initially supported Indonesia. This group, led by Silas Papare, 
mostly left WNG for Indonesia and formed the Gerakan Rakyat Irian Barat (GRIB, 
West Irian People's Movement). In 1956, Papare declared an autonomous Indonesian 
province of West Irian, but Indonesia refused to acknowledge it, instead setting up its 
own paper province.11 Since this province was headed by the Sultan of Tidore, best 
known for his dynasty's slave trade of Papuans, it was unlikely to attract much Papuan 
support. It was most important, however, as a sign that the Indonesian government 
intended to claim the territory of WNG without reference even to Papuans who called 
for incorporation of the territory into Indonesia.
The GRIB Papuans cannot be dismissed as simply "pro-Indonesian." It could be 
argued that they were, in a sense, exercising self-determination in making a choice for 
a self-governing WNG federated with Indonesia. After the New Guinea Council was in 
place, and especially after the Papuan flag was raised on December 1, 1961, some of 
them may have joined the call for an independent West Papua. Papare told the 
American ambassador in December 1961 that he planned to return home and assist in 
composing an independence declaration, and he requested United States support for 
the new nation. A little under a year later, Papare was reported to have been arrested 
and jailed in Jakarta on suspicion of opposing Indonesian government policies.12
On December 19, 1961, Sukarno issued the "three-fold command of the people" 
(Trikora), specifically designed to thwart Papuan self-determination before it was too 
late. Shortly thereafter, he wrote to Kennedy: "I hope to have your understanding that 
as long as the Netherlands continue with their preparations for the proclamation of 
Independent Papua (the so-called Papua flag and national anthem have already been 
introduced into West Irian), there is no alternative left to us but the use of force in 
order to face this illegal, forceful occupation of West Irian by the Netherlands."13
9 Wiryopranoto, speech to General Assembly, November 8,1961, UN document A/PV.1049, p. 599.
10 Ibid.; Background to Indonesia's Policy towards Malaysia: The Territory o f the Indonesian State, Discussions o f 
the Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapkan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1964).
11 Jaren van Reconstructie: Nieww-Guinea van 1949 tot 1961 ('s-Hertegenbosch: n.p., 1962), p. 210, at
http:/ /cornell.worldcat.org/htle/ jarcn-van-rcconstructic-nieuw-guinea-van-1949-tot-1961 -a-reshaping- 
process-in-new-guineaT949T961-with-a-summary-in-english/oclc/9657924&referer=brief_results; and 
Autonomous Province o f  West Irian (Jakarta: Department of Informahon, 1956).
12 US Embassy in Jakarta to DOS, December 15,1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 205; Committee Self-Determination 
New Guinee to U Thant, November 20,1962, United Nations Archives (henceforth UNA), S-0279-0025- 
0004.
13 Sukarno to Kennedy, December 16,1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 113.
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Self-determination Ignored: US Policy
From the beginning of the Kennedy administration's reconsideration of the WNG 
problem, the question of self-determination appears to have had virtually no impact on 
the thinking of American government officials. It was simply not on the agenda, except 
as an idea to dismiss.
The United States shocked Dutch and Papuan leaders when it decided to boycott 
the installation of the newly elected New Guinea Council in April 1961. This decision 
reversed one made a few days earlier, when the United States had declared its 
intention to send representatives to the Council, and was made personally by JFK as a 
result of the grave international situation: a verbal commitment to send American 
troops to Laos. Given this plan to intervene in Laos, the United States did not wish to 
take the chance of further inflaming the situation in Southeast Asia. As a State 
Department position paper for Kennedy noted, "we were seriously concerned with the 
Laos situation at that time and desired to prevent a political explosion in this sensitive 
area ... in view of our larger responsibilities in Asia, it was a decision that we 
considered must be made."14
The decision to boycott the April ceremonies also managed to curry favor with 
Sukarno's government just days before the Indonesian president arrived in 
Washington for a state visit. As one national security staffer wrote: "The US reversal of 
its stand on attendance at the Dutch New Guinea ceremonies has had a very favorable 
impact upon the Indonesians. This action and our UN action on Angola seem to have 
had a considerable effect in convincing the Indonesians that the new Administration 
takes a different view of colonial questions."15
No key American officials seem to have held any belief in self-determination, 
believing the Papuans were not likely to be ready for self-government any time soon. 
This attitude was reinforced by a distinct racism in the inner circles of the civil rights 
administration. Robert Komer, the responsible official on Kennedy's national security 
staff for Asia and Africa, called for "cold realpolitik," which meant being willing to 
sacrifice "a few thousand square miles of cannibal land." Fellow national security 
staffer Robert Johnson regretted that, "We never indicated to the Dutch officially that 
we considered self-determination [a] meaningless facade when applied to stone-age 
people almost totally lacking in contact with the modern world." Robert Amory of the 
CIA called a plebiscite "farcical ... considering the stone-age level of the West New 
Guineans."16
The "official mind" of the Kennedy administration, in other words, had space for 
the principle of self-determination, but none for the application of that principle to 
WNG, which the officials perceived as a mere "bit of colonial debris" complicating 
Southeast Asian strategy. Popular images did little to change that: the vast WNG
14 Memo of conversation, March 27,1962, JFKL, POF, Box 122a, file 3; Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 
March 24,1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 423; US position paper on Luns visit, April 10-11,1961, JFKL, POF, Box 
122a.
15 Memo of conversation, April 17,1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 113.
16 Robert Komer memo, "Why Trusteeship Won't Work," February 17,1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 205; Komer to 
Bundy, February 16,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 206; memo to President, November 30,1961, FRUS 1961-63,13, 
p. 467; and memo by Robert Amory, February 20,1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 206.
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region was represented dimly through images of half-naked Dani tribesmen 
transmitted by Harvard anthropologists, and known as the place where New York 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller's anthropologist son Michael drowned in 1961.
Self-determination Outvoted: The UN General Assembly, 1961
Dutch foreign minister Luns took a plan for self-determination to the UN in the fall 
of 1961. "What is important now, and of paramount importance, is the future of 
Netherlands New Guinea," he declared. "On that future, no one except the Papuans 
themselves is entitled to decide."17 Nevertheless, the Luns plan was based almost 
entirely on discussions not with Papuans but with United States officials. The debate 
on WNG took place in the context of the broader UN debate on implementation of the 
declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. A 
thirty-eight-country resolution from Third World states was passed calling for the 
granting of independence to all countries not yet independent, and creating the Special 
Committee on Decolonization. With Indonesia as one of the lead sponsors, the 
resolution also expressed concern that territorial integrity of some states was being 
disrupted by decolonization processes (the implicit reference here was to Indonesia's 
claim to WNG, Iraq's to Kuwait, and similar cases).
WNG was the only country to be considered specifically in the debate on the 
declaration when participants turned to discuss the granting of independence to 
colonial countries and peoples. After some negative reactions, the Luns plan was 
withdrawn in favor of one advanced by the Brazzaville group of African states, most of 
them having recently achieved independence from France. The Dutch and then the 
Brazzaville group presented their plans as attempts to realize the general intent of the 
declaration in a specific case where decolonization had not yet been implemented. The 
thirteen-country Brazzaville group resolution (sponsored by Cameroun, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta) called for 
negotiations on WNG and also for a UN Commission on WNG, which would make 
recommendations as to self-determination if negotiations did not succeed within one 
year. In speeches, the Brazzaville countries highlighted the rights of the people of 
WNG as their central concern.
Although Western countries backed this resolution, Indonesia objected to its stress 
on self-determination, arguing that self-determination had already been exercised for 
all of Indonesia in 1945 and that WNG could not be "amputated" from Indonesia. 
Indonesia also demanded support from other Third World countries and was able to 
call in debts from many in Asia and Africa. In many cases (particularly in Africa), the 
delegates originally favored the self-determination plans, but Indonesian pressure (in 
at least one case including a threat to break diplomatic relations) forced a vote 
against.18 The resolution received 53 votes in favor, to 41 against, with 9 abstentions, 
falling short of the two-thirds majority needed for passage. Essentially, the votes were
17 Luns speech to General Assembly, November 8, 1961, UN document A/PV.1049, p. 589.
18 Adlai Stevenson, US ambassador to UN, to DOS, September 27, 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 205; US embassy 
Rio de Janeiro to DOS, September 27, 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 205.
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distributed according to region. In favor were the Brazzaville African countries, most 
of Latin America, Western Europe, and North America. Opposed were the Casablanca 
group of African countries, most of Asia, and the Soviet bloc.
The Brazzaville initiative is generally downplayed or ignored in accounts of the 
WNG dispute. It should not be. For this group, the decolonization of WNG was 
perceived as part of an international wave of decolonization that had liberated a 
number of African states. The geographical distance separating Africa from Papua was 
considered immaterial. This is a theme that Papuan diplomats sought to play upon in 
their search for African support. Nor was this feeling confined to those more moderate 
African states: Tanzania launched a brief effort, its first initiative outside Africa, to 
promote a peaceful settlement of the WNG dispute that would protect Papuan self- 
determination.
Although the United States' mission to the UN suggested the Brazzaville states be 
congratulated for their constructive efforts, the White House ignored that idea and 
shifted towards taking over control of the WNG file, a responsibility previously left to 
the State Department. "At that point," recalled Dutch Ambassador to the United States, 
J. H. van Roijen, members of the Kennedy administration "decided they could no 
longer stand behind us."19 The first American move to resolve the WNG dispute 
through the UN had backfired. Now Kennedy's national security staff began to 
recommend a tougher line. "[W]ith the failure of our UN gambit," Komer 
recommended, "the time has come to take the gloves off, and adopt a frankly pro- 
Indonesian stance while there's still time to get some political capital out of it."20
Self-determination Abandoned: The 1962 Negotiations and Huntlands Agreement
January 1962 marked a turning point. At this time, the US president's office 
decided that the United States would have to get involved to resolve the issue, and 
from the beginning Kennedy's staff felt that any solution would have to be on 
Indonesian terms. The State Department was not so convinced, but the consistent 
White House policy to favor Indonesia has to be noted as background to all US policy 
twists and public statements from this point onwards. American officials had 
professed to the Dutch that the United States would support self-determination for the 
Papuans, but ceased to mention it in talks with the Indonesians.
The Netherlands made its own policy shift in January 1962. Prime Minister J. E. de 
Quay offered to talk to the Indonesians and drop his government's precondition that 
self-determination be endorsed, asking, in return, that Indonesia abandon its 
precondition that the purpose of the talks would be to transfer WNG to Indonesia. 
Indonesian foreign minister Subandrio counter-proposed that "Sukarno would make a 
statement on self-determination in return for Dutch agreement [that the] purpose [of] 
talks [was to] transfer administration [of WNG] to Indonesia." This deal, if accepted, 
would have offered Papuans a better deal than they eventually received. Luns, in fact, 
told the United States that the "Netherlands Government will not agree to turn over
19 van Roijen oral history, JFKL.
20 Memo to Rostow, November 30,1961, FRUS 1961-63,13, pp. 469-70.
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administration to Indonesia] no matter what guarantees there are for eventual exercise 
[of] self-determination by Papuans."2' Dutch diplomatic prestige, in other words, 
outweighed Dutch promises that Papuans would be ensured of self-determination.
After Robert Kennedy visited Jakarta and The Hague in February to urge talks, 
eight New Guinea Council members wired John F. Kennedy:
We protest strongly Robert Kennedy's humiliating statements on television 
concerning backwardness Papuan people and lack university trained workers, 
seemingly indicating advise [sic] to Indonesia to eradicate Papuan people ... 
Independence and democracy can be understood and practiced by common 
people even if they have not seen Harvard and we have an unalienable right to 
such practicing and we ask technical aid for it from the more advanced people of 
the world. Robert Kennedy should be ashamed if he tries to play poker with the 
fate of backward people for no other reason than to appease a dictator.21 2
This telegram was not answered. "In the opinion of the Department, there is no 
advantage to be gained by replying to these persons," the State Department advised 
the president.23
In March, Luns visited Washington, DC. According to the official record of his 
meeting with John Kennedy, "the president emphasized that by concentrating too 
much on the future of the Papuan population we may be forgetting our other 
obligations in Asia and free Europe." In this meeting, Luns abandoned his earlier 
commitments to include Papuans in the Dutch delegation to any negotiations with 
Indonesia.24
American pressure finally forced both sides to agree to negotiations that opened in 
March 1962 at the Huntlands estate near Washington, DC. Mediator Ellsworth Bunker 
was ostensibly acting for UN Secretary General U Thant, but in fact acted as a 
representative of the United States government.25 Talks opened with the Dutch 
insisting that WNG must be granted self-determination, that this was their bottom line, 
and the United States calling self-determination a high principle. In the course of talks, 
the principle was abandoned by all negotiators and replaced with a face-saving 
promise that an "act of free choice" would be proposed and representatives of Papua 
be given the opportunity to vote on the measure in 1969; this promise was written into 
the final agreement.
Van Roijen told Bunker that he believed WNG would eventually go to Indonesia 
because "there is no other place for it to go." He said Papuans must have "a fair
21 Arend Lijphart, The Trauma o f  Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1966), p. 277; DOS to US embassy Jakarta, January 16,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 205; US 
embassy The Hague to DOS, February 3,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 205.
22 Papuan telegram and covering note from L. D. Battle to Bundy, March 8,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 206.
“ Ibid.
24 Memo of conversation, March 2,1962, FRUS 1961-63,13, p. 549; Markin, "The West Irian Dispute," pp. 
115-18.
25 McMullen, Mediation.
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referendum, plebiscite, or other mode of self-determination." Consequently, Bunker's 
formulas begin to refer to an act of self-determination in very vague terms.20
Bunker put forth a formula that formed the basis of the eventual deal: the 
Netherlands would hand WNG over to the UN, which would administer the territory 
for a short interim period and then hand it to Indonesia, with the final step being an act 
of self-determination organized by the Indonesian government and the UN together. 
This precisely duplicated an earlier suggestion from Indonesian foreign minister 
Subandrio that his country might be willing to "borrow the hand of the United 
Nations" in order to ease transfer of control. Yet this plan was no longer enough for an 
increasingly assertive regime in Jakarta. Indonesian delegates broke off talks, 
prompting Bunker to add to his formula the idea that transfer must come before self- 
determination. The suggestion, which seemed to represent US government policy also, 
brought talks back on course. Van Roijen said this would be regarded as "abject 
surrender." Putting the transfer clearly first meant, in the words of a source close to 
Bunker, "the plebiscite would be essentially a face-saving device for the Dutch rather 
than a meaningful expression of free choice." Van Roijen professed shock that the plan 
seemed to put Western interests ahead of the Papuans'; Bunker "agreed bluntly his 
thinking was in fact in those terms."26 7
The Bunker plan was backed over the next months by the full weight of American, 
British, and Australian diplomacy. In a confidential discussion at NATO headquarters, 
Stikker noted that Luns had reported Papuans now held 60 percent of administrative 
positions. "If this is so, Stikker suggested, then Papouans [sic] themselves could be 
given responsibility of negotiating directly with Indonesians. Stikker thought that 
Papouans should be permitted to act without Dutch participation, since in the latter 
case they would be 'swamped' by Dutch."28There was no apparent attempt to act on 
this suggestion.
In other words, Papuans were sidelined completely in the negotiations process, 
which seems to indicate the Dutch prized self-determination as a high principle but 
had little real interest in seeing it exercised. There is little indication that they fought 
very hard to have Papuans included in the talks, only that they jealously guarded their 
prerogatives as an administering power. The United States was only too happy to go 
along. In the words of US Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Averell 
Harriman: "We were trying to save the Dutch from themselves."29
Enormous pressure was exerted in this quest. John Kennedy wrote to de Quay on 
April 2,1962, to call for talks to resume lest a war break out.
This would be a war in which neither The Netherlands nor the West could win in 
any real sense. Whatever the outcome of particular military encounters, the entire
26 McGhee to Jones, March 23,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 206; Markin, "The West Irian Dispute," p. 163, italics 
in original.
27 McMullen, Mediation, pp. 28-31; March 27,1962, conversation with Bunker, cited in Markin, "The West 
Irian Dispute," p. 180; and van Roijen oral history, JFKL.
28 Stuart Doran, "Western Friends and Eastern Neighbours: West New Guinea and Australian Self- 
Perception in Relation to the United States, Britain, and Southeast Asia, 1950-1962" (PhD Dissertation, 
Australian National University, 1999); US embassy Paris to DOS, May 22,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 206.
29 Harriman oral history, JFKL.
Self-Determination Abandoned 19
free world position in Asia would be seriously damaged. Only the communists 
would benefit from such a conflict. If the Indonesian Army were committed to an 
all-out war against The Netherlands, the moderate elements within the army and 
the country would be quickly eliminated leaving a clear field for communist 
intervention. If Indonesia were to succumb to communism in these circumstances 
the whole non-communist position in Viet-Nam, Thailand, and Malaya would be 
in grave peril and as you know these are areas in which we in the United States 
have heavy commitments.1"
Bunker assured van Roijen that the United States government "expected" a free 
and fair exercise of self-determination for the Papuans. But Bunker's true views came 
through in an off-the-record press briefing: "The country itself is not viable. The 
inhabitants are largely backward, living, I am told, most of them in the Stone Age, 
except along the coastal areas, fringes along the coast ... I think you would understand 
that, certainly in my opinion, a very small part of the population today is capable of 
exercising self-determination, or any determination of anything for that matter."30 1
At the same time, the United States sought and obtained from the Netherlands 
assurances that there were no plans to declare an independent Papuan state on April 5 
to mark the first anniversary of the New Guinea Council. "Essential you obtain from 
Netherlands Government assurances which we can pass on to Indonesians that 
Papuan independence will not be announced," Rusk instructed his ambassador in The 
Hague. The United States even tried to prevent a visit to WNG by the UN ambassadors 
of Dahomey and Upper Volta. The Dutch offered promises that they would not 
authorize an independence declaration, and that if one were made they would oppose 
it.32
International pressure brought both sides back to Huntlands in July. By the end of 
talks, Indonesian delegate Adam Malik had agreed to all but one of Bunker's draft 
points of agreement—the point on self-determination. Bunker's next list of twenty 
points, seen as a framework for a final agreement, avoided use of the term "Papuans" 
in favor of "inhabitants of the territory."33
A UN official, Constantine Stavropoulos, was asked to prepare an outline of how 
the act of free choice might be carried out. A cover note from Stavropoulos indicated 
his sympathy for Papuan claims: "... at least since President Wilson enunciated the 
principle of self-determination in 1918, there appears to emerge a strong presumption 
in favour of self-determination in situations such as that of Western New Guinea on 
the basis of the wishes of the people of the territory concerned, irrespective of the legal 
stands or interests of other parties to the question." Bunker initially welcomed the 
plan, but backtracked when Malik objected.34 The proposal was then jettisoned in favor 
of a single article that appeared in the final agreement. The differences between
30 Kennedy letter to de Quay, April 2,1962, JFKL, POF, Box 122a.
31 McMullen, Mediation, p. 38; Bunker press briefing, June 1,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 423.
32 DOS to US embassy The Hague, March 31,1962, and US embassy The Hague to DOS, April 1,1962, JFKL, 
NSF, Box 206.
33 US embassy The Hague to DOS, April 1,1962, JFKL, NSF, Box 206.
34 Cover note of Stavropoulos study, June 29,1962, and Stavropoulos Plan, UNA, S-0884-0023-03; 
Stavropoulos to U Thant, July 18,1962, UNA, S-0884-22-6.
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Stavropoulos's proposal and this agreement were significant. Under the Stavropoulos 
plan, a UN commissioner would be continuously present in WNG until the "act of free 
choice" was put up for a vote, and that commissioner would both "participate and 
assist" in consultations with the population on the method of the act, its timing and 
conditions, the formulation of questions, and establishing categories of eligible voters 
on the basis of universal adult suffrage. In the final Huntlands agreement, however, 
UN staff duties were limited to "advising on, and assisting in, preparations for 
carrying out the provisions for self-determination except as Indonesia and the 
Secretary-General may agree upon their performing other functions." Staff would 
remain as needed, but a UN commissioner would be appointed only one year before 
the act. Indonesia was to make arrangements to consult the population concerning the 
best means of determining the popular will.35
Even autonomy was abandoned without comment during talks. Indonesia had 
been promising some form of autonomy to Papua for years. As late as January 1962, 
Subandrio told the US ambassador that "Indonesians would leave Papuans in charge 
in West New Guinea, that there would be no attempt to put Javanese or Ambonese 
administrators in the territory." Now, these promises were discarded. "When West 
Irian becomes a part of Indonesia it will be governed centrally from Jakarta," said one 
Indonesian negotiator, adding "we do not want a legally separate apparatus in West 
Irian. Psychologically that is unacceptable."36
The terms of the final Huntlands agreement were similar to those Subandrio had 
floated in the UN, terms previously rejected by the Netherlands representative as "a 
mockery of the principle of free choice." When the deal was concluded, most observers 
felt the same. "No one regarded the stipulations for 'free choice' by the Papuans as 
more than a formality," according to the annual international affairs survey published 
by the Council on Foreign Relations.3
A UN resolution endorsing the deal passed 89 to zero, but with 14 abstentions. The 
abstentions came from twelve African states (Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Togo, 
and Upper Volta), plus France and Haiti. Objections on the grounds of self- 
determination were voiced by Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Togo.38
The Act of No Self-determination
The day after the agreement was signed in New York, Kennedy sent a letter to 
Queen Juliana of the Netherlands. "We know how deeply your Government has been 
concerned to reach an honorable future for the Papuan people, and I want to assure
35 Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West 
New Guinea (West Irian), articles 16-18.
36 US embassy Jakarta to DOS, January 8,1962, JFKL, NSF Box 205; Zain, in Huydecoper's notes, cited in 
Markin, "The West Irian Dispute," pp. 365-66.
37 Dutch ambassador Schuurman, General Assembly speech, November 15,1961, UN document 
A/PV.1055, p. 665; Richard Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1962 (New York, NY: Harper & 
Brothers, 1963), p. 209.
38 General Assembly Official Records, A/PV.1127, A/PV.1150.
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you of the continuing concern of the United States for this same objective," he wrote.39 
But any American inclination to monitor the agreement soon vanished as the 
Netherlands seemed disinclined to pay much attention to seeing that a plebiscite was 
actually held. In May 1963, for example, the State Department reported to Kennedy in 
advance of a meeting with Luns that the Dutch were reportedly willing to drop the 
plebiscite idea.40
Indonesia never accepted that there was any obligation to hold a plebiscite under 
international law, since the Huntlands agreement was merely a bilateral pact between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands (this is why the UN General Assembly was only asked 
to "take note" of the agreement and not to endorse it). Still more seriously, Indonesia 
explicitly denied that the Papuans had a right to self-determination. Papuans would be 
given the opportunity to vote on the act of free choice, the Suharto government 
announced, only in order to show that Indonesia honored its treaties.41 Given the 
power of this Jakarta-centric viewpoint, it is hardly surprising that there was no valid 
self-determination in 1969. Indonesian policymakers accepted that they had to display 
the forms of determining the people's opinion, but never accepted any obligation 
actually to determine the people's opinion.
There was little concern with self-determination when the UN gave its seal of 
approval to the integration of Papua into Indonesia in 1969. Lingering efforts were 
made by a number of African states to see the reality of self-determination exercised, 
however. Ghana called for a new act of free choice, which would be submitted to the 
people by 1975. This plan was rejected 60 to 15 (those in favor: Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, 
Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Barbados, Central African Republic, and Dahomey) with 39 abstentions. The final vote 
approved the act by 84 to zero, but symbolic abstentions in support of the principle of 
self-determination were made by thirty countries. Senegal voted in favor, but then 
announced it had meant to vote against.42 Only in the past decade is the international 
legality of the whole arrangement being reconsidered and questioned.43
The Need for Historical Dialogue
Indonesian and Papuan nationalists deploy very different versions of this history. 
The two clashing historical narratives are not simply different ways of representing the 
past. The different perceptions of the past are a root cause that helps to constitute the
39 Kennedy to Queen Juliana, August 16,1962, JFKL, POF, Box 122a.
40 Memorandum from Bruebeck to Bundy, May 24,1963, JFKL, POF, Box 122a.
41 Speech of Foreign Minister Adam Malik to the UN, General Assembly Official Records, meeting of 
November 13,1969, A/PV.1810; Indonesia's report on the act of free choice, Annex B to UN document 
A/ 7723; and Summary of actions taken to date by UN to implement its part in New York Agreement, 
[1967 Secretariat note], UNA, S-0884-23-10.
42 General Assembly Official Records, November 13 and November 19,1962, UN documents A/PV.1810, 
A/PV.1812, and A/PV.1813.
43 Powes Parkop, "Reinscription of West Papua as a Colonised State and People,"
http: / / www.freewestpapua.org/docs/ parkop.htm, accessed January 24, 2013; Jason MacLeod and Brian 
Martin, "The legal strategy for West Papua: Will it Fly? What Might Help It To?" University of Sydney 
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2012, http:/ /sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/ 
working_papers/WPP%203.pdf, accessed January 29, 2013.
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current conflict. Historical dialogue is needed if there is to be any prospect of resolving 
the conflict, since the perception of "sovereignty-denied" is itself a root cause of 
Papuan nationalist feeling and aspirations.
The Indonesian nationalist narrative about Papua is a story of dispossession, Dutch 
colonialism, and Indonesia's ultimate victory in its anticolonial struggle. According to 
this narrative, the campaign to complete the decolonization of the whole East Indies 
served as a mobilizing focus to unite the new Indonesian state. The use of history to 
build unity peaked under Suharto. Centralizing nationalist historiographies left little 
space for local tellings: "The history classroom functioned to suppress knowledge of 
difference," as Jean Taylor has written. The key problem, in the words of historian Asvi 
Warman Adam, is that "Indonesian history was written uniformly by men in 
uniform."44 So the 1969 "act of free choice" was less referendum—a word never used— 
than a display of respect for legal norms, designed for international consumption. The 
"West Irian struggle," a piece of Indonesian-nationalist historiography, erased the 
people from their own story.45 46
The Papuan nationalist version of history, by contrast, argues that justice has been 
denied, and this confers a moral right to self-determination. It holds that the right of 
self-determination can only be exercised by the Papuan people. According to many 
who share this perspective, self-determination was actually exercised in 1961 when the 
Papuan flag flew for the first time, and Papua has been "already sovereign" ever 
since.45 One claim of self-determination put forward at a mass meeting in Biak in 1962 
will serve to illustrate many. According to the UN declaration on decolonization, the 
meeting resolved that: "the rights of small nations are the same as those of the big 
nations. Thus the rights of the Papuans are the same as those of the Americans, and the 
rights of the Papuans are the same as those of the Burmese." But the United States had 
"sold the rights of the independence of the Papuan population to Indonesia through 
the Bunker proposal, in order to be forever colonised by Indonesia." Thus, the meeting 
rejected the Bunker plan, which "means the surrender of our country and population 
to Indonesia."47
The theme of self-determination denied persists, and continues to lie close to the 
root of conflict. The Papuan historical narrative has emerged in the gaps in the official 
Indonesian version of the region's history. Because Papua can make historical claims to 
independence based on the 1949-62 period, its nationalist movement regularly 
demands a setting-straight of the historical record (pelurusan sejarah). Only through this
44 Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia: Peoples and Histories (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 362; 
Adam cited in Armando Siahaan, "Setting History Straight," Jakarta Globe, April 30, 2009,
http:/ / lists.topica.com/lists/indonesia-act@igc.topica.com/read/message.html?sort=d&mid=813476589, 
accessed January 29, 2013.
45 See, for instance, Sejarah Nasional, jilid 3 untuk SMA [National History for Upper-Level High Schools] 
(Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1981), pp. 157-61.
46 "Bangsa Papua telah berdaulat sebagai sebuah bangsa dan negara sejak 1 Desember 1961," Second 
Papuan Congress resolution, June 4, 2000. The official English version adopts the name "West Papua" for 
international consumption: "The People of West Papua has been Independent as a Sovereign Nation and 
State since 1 December 1961." See http://dujanwendanak.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/kongres-rakyat- 
papua-ii-resolusi/ and an and an english translation at http: / / www.freewestpapua.org/ docs/ 
congressII.htm both accessed Feb. 10, 2013.
47 Resolution of Biak-Nunfoor mass meeting, August 10,1962, UNA S-0884-0023-0001.
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"straightening" can the "memory of suffering" (memoria passionis) be satisfied and 
peace be made possible.48
Historical narratives are not just classroom stories. They can be used to justify acts 
of violence. Indonesian security forces continue to tag any Papuan dissident as a 
"separatist" and to treat that label as sufficient justification to adopt repressive tactics. 
A 2005 protest in Papua demanded the end to state violence committed against people 
"simply because their understanding of history differs from that of the government."49
The democratic governments that emerged in Indonesia after the fall of President 
Suharto in 1998 offered special autonomy for Papua, a move with potential to resolve 
the conflict. In avoiding the symbolic aspects of the struggle and refusing to engage in 
a dialogue that addressed historical narratives, however, Indonesia's central 
government failed to do so. Jakarta granted a greater share of the region's natural 
resource revenues and political autonomy to the Papuans, but rejected their symbolic 
claims and thus ignored the emotive force behind calls for independence. The issue 
was still framed in terms of uneven economic development, so the solution remained 
development-oriented. The Papuan call for historical dialogue became, in the final 
autonomy package passed in Jakarta, a commission empowered to "provide 
clarification of Papua's history in order to strengthen the people's unity in the State of 
the Republic of Indonesia." 50
In the dialogue that achieved a peace deal in Aceh, both sides agreed to lay aside 
their historical grievances and start fresh. Such an approach is less viable in Papua, 
where the perception of historical betrayal fuels nationalist sentiment. An 
acknowledgement of the Papuans' historical grievances will have to be included in any 
dialogue, as a key starting point, or else dialogue will ignore a key cause of conflict. 
This point was accepted in a recent "Papua Road map" from the Indonesian Institute 
of Sciences (LIPI, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia), but not as yet by the 
Indonesian government. A coordinating author of the "road map," Muridan Widodo, 
wrote recently: "History should not be treated as a fixed position involving absolute 
truth and determining collective identity. Rather, history should be treated as a 
negotiable construction involving acceptance and compromise, and providing benefits 
for both parties rather than being the monopoly of just one side. Otherwise, history in 
Papua will perpetuate an endless cycle of violence."51 Any prospect of lasting peace 
will need to include an honest reexamination of the period in which self-determination
48 Memoria Passionis is the title of an annual series of human rights reports from the Catholic diocese of 
Jayapura, accessible from http:/ / www.hampapua.org/skp/index2.html, accessed January 24, 2013.
49 "The Six Demands of the Dewan Adat Papua, August 12, 2005," accessed February 10, 2013, from 
http: / / lists.topica.com/lists/ WestPapua/read/ message.html?sort=a&mid=l 719298284
50 Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian, Keuskupan Jayapura, Catatan Perkembangan Terkini di Papua: 
Otonomi Klmsus, proses dan hasil akhirnya [Social-Political note on recent developments in Papua: the special 
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Jayapura, 2001).
51 Muridan S. Widodo, "Negotiating the Past and Looking to the Future," Inside Indonesia 98 (October- 
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was abandoned, the two years leading up to the 1962 New York Agreement. To be 
fully effective, reconsideration needs to take place not only in Jakarta and Papua, but 
also in Washington, DC, where self-determination evaporated in the interests of US 
Cold War realpolitik.
